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Non-Technical Summary 
Literature on monetary transmission mechanism often argues that regulating money supply 
become difficult in presence of excess bank liquidity. Any attempt by the central bank to 
stimulate aggregate demand by relaxing monetary policy will only increase the prevalent 
interbank market liquidity. Likewise, if the central bank adopts monetary tightening, any sudden 
improvement in credit demand may cause rapid increase in credit which may subvert the central 
bank’s tightening initiative.  
Government borrowing from the banking sector in Pakistan increased considerably 
between 2005 and 2011. At the same time, the interbank market of Pakistan has experienced an 
unprecedented accumulation of excess liquidity. This paper explores the impact of excess 
interbank liquidity on the monetary transmission in Pakistan. For this purpose, the short- and 
long-run pass-through of changes in policy instruments to lending and deposit rates and the 
exchange rate is estimated with and without excess interbank liquidity in the model.  
Specifically, the paper asks the questions: 1) what is the impact of the main policy tools 
of the SBP on retail rates and the exchange rate? 2) does excess interbank liquidity affect the 
monetary transmission mechanism, i.e., the pass-through of the policy tools to the retail rates and 
the exchange rate? A significant impact of excess liquidity on the monetary policy pass-through 
will undermine monetary policy.  
We have examined not only the transmission of changes in the discount rate, but also the 
transmission of changes in reserve requirements. Previous empirical studies have largely ignored 
the pass-through of required reserves as a monetary policy tool, as they are not changed very 
frequently. Currently, reserve requirements on banks in Pakistan are based on time and demand 
liabilities separately, which produced sufficient variability in this policy tool to be used for a 
meaningful economic analysis.  
In addition to the transmission of shocks from policy tools to retail interest rates, we also 
have examined the transmission of these shocks to the exchange rate. The impact of the changes 
in the policy tools on the exchange rate was completely ignored in previous studies on Pakistan. 
The SBP, like other central banks, does not pay attention to the exchange rate specifically. 
However, central banks’ interest in the exchange rate developments is well documented by 
McKinnon (1995), Clarida and Gertler (1997), and Clarida (2001). The use of monetary policy 
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tools in tandem with the speculative pressure on the Pakistan Rupee-US Dollar exchange rate 
often creates the impression that the SBP uses a de facto fixed exchange rate policy. This paper 
shows that only required reserves has an impact on the exchange rate which is likely to bring 
clarity in understanding the exchange rate channel of monetary policy pass-through in Pakistan.  
The main findings of this paper suggest that excess liquidity significantly affect the pass-
through of the policy tools to the lending rate. Excess liquidity has no long-run effect on the 
pass-through of the policy tools to deposit rate and (growth of) exchange rate. Moreover, the 
pass-through of the discount rate to the lending rate is complete but it is incomplete for required 
reserves. Furthermore, only changes to required reserves have an effect on the deposit rate and 
the exchange rate in the long run. Moreover, our results suggest the presence of a structural shift 
in the interbank money market in Pakistan in June 2008. Studies ignoring this shift may produce 
misleading conclusions.  
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1. Introduction  
 
Usually, it is assumed that a change in central bank interest rates is transmitted through interbank 
liquidity to lending and deposit rates, thereby influencing spending decisions of firms and 
households (Mohanty and Turner, 2008). The role of interbank liquidity in monetary 
transmission has mostly been examined theoretically.
1
 The empirical literature has mainly 
assessed the transmission mechanism following Bernanke and Gertler’s (1995) ‘black box’ 
approach ignoring the role of interbank liquidity. The role played by interbank liquidity is still 
not well understood, even though there is some evidence that notably the presence of excess 
liquidity may limit the ability of central banks in developing economies to conduct monetary 
policy effectively.
2
  
The experience of Pakistan provides a good illustration of the issue at hand as the 
interbank market of Pakistan has witnessed an unprecedented growth in excess liquidity in the 
recent period. Since 2006, repeated attempts by the State Bank of Pakistan (henceforth SBP) to 
increase deposit rates using monetary policy tools proved largely ineffective. In its Monetary 
Policy Statement of July 2011 (SBP, 2011), the SBP acknowledges weaknesses in the monetary 
policy transmission mechanism.
3
 Several studies point to excess interbank liquidity as an 
important cause for ailing monetary transmission. For instance, Agénor and Aynaoui (2010) 
argue that excess liquidity leads to stickiness of the deposit rate during monetary contractions in 
middle-income economies, undermining the effectiveness of deflationary monetary policy.  
We investigate the impact of interbank liquidity on monetary transmission mechanism in 
Pakistan.  Specifically, this study assesses the interest rate pass-through using monthly data from 
July 2004 to December 2011. The pass-through of the discount rate and required reserves is used 
to describe how changes in the central bank’s policy tools have a short-run and a long-run impact 
                                                          
1
 See, for example, Ganley (2004), Ulrich et al. (2004), Allen et al. (2009), Agénor and Aynaoui (2010), Freixas et 
al. (2011), and Acharya et al. (2012). 
2
 See, for example, Nissanke and Aryeetey (1998), Agénor et al. (2004), Saxegaard (2006), and Agénor and Aynaoui 
(2010). 
3
 SBP (2011, pp. 11), states that;  
“… unlike the lending rates, the (Weighted Average) Deposit Rate (WADR) has not changed much during fiscal 
year 2011. It increased from 6.8 % in June 2010 to 7.2 percent in June 2011. This represents a weakness in the 
monetary transmission mechanism as is evident from a stagnant and high currency to deposit ratio of 29% on 30
th
 
June 2011.”  
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on the retail lending and deposit rates. We also investigate the policy instruments’ pass-through 
to the exchange rate. We address the following research questions: What is the impact of the 
main policy tools of the SBP on retail lending and deposit rates, and the exchange rate? Does 
excess interbank liquidity affect the monetary transmission mechanism, i.e., the pass-through of 
the policy tools to the retail rates and the exchange rate?  
Our study is unique in a number of ways. To the best of our knowledge, the role of 
interbank liquidity has never been assessed directly in research on monetary transmission in 
developing economies. Previous studies on non-industrial countries, such as Egert and 
MacDonald (2009) and Gigineishvili (2011), evaluate the impact of interbank liquidity only 
indirectly (see Section 2 for more details).  
Moreover, we examine not only the transmission of changes in the discount rate, but also 
of changes in the reserve requirements. Previous empirical studies have ignored the pass-through 
of the required reserves, as they are not changed very frequently. However, from July 22 2006 
onwards, the SBP has imposed reserve requirements on banks for time and demand liabilities 
separately, so that there is sufficient variability in required reserves for a meaningful economic 
analysis.  
Finally, in addition to the transmission of policy tools to retail interest rates, we also 
examine their transmission to the exchange rate. As central banks in several emerging economies 
aim to stabilize exchange rates, a better understanding of monetary transmission mechanisms 
requires an analysis of the response of the exchange rate to a monetary policy shock (Disyatat 
and Vongsinsirikul, 2003; and Aleem, 2010). In a small open economy, the exchange rate 
channel may often affect the economy through the bond market and the banking system 
(Adolfson, 2001).
4
  
Our results suggest that the pass-through of the discount rate to the lending rate is 
complete but it is incomplete for required reserves. However, only shocks to required reserves 
have an effect on the deposit rate and the exchange rate in the long run. Finally, our findings 
suggest a structural shift in June 2008 in the interbank money market in Pakistan. 
The study is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature, while Section 
                                                          
4
 Bhattacharya et al. (2011), Smets and Wouters (2002); Zorzi et al. (2007) and Ito and Sato (2008) analyze the 
inter-linkages between the interest and exchange rate channels.  
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3 discusses monetary policy in Pakistan. Section 4 outlines the methodology and Section 5 
describes the data employed. Section 6 analyzes the results obtained and Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Literature review  
 
The literature suggests that the transmission of monetary policy changes to lending and deposit 
rates may be impaired due to several structural rigidities. Previous studies investigating this issue 
have referred to market concentration and lack of competition (Hannan and Berger, 1991; and 
Neumark and Sharp, 1992), menu costs (Cottarelli and Kourelis, 1994; and Mester and Saunders, 
1995), asymmetric information (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981), high volatility and uncertainty (Borio 
and Fitz, 1995) and excess market liquidity (Sørensen and Warner, 2006; Lucchetta, 2007; Egert 
and MacDonald, 2009; and Gigineishvili, 2011).  
So far, empirical studies have paid limited attention to the effect of excess interbank 
liquidity on monetary policy transmission in developing countries (Agénor and Aynaoui, 2010), 
even though several theoretical studies referred to earlier suggest that excess liquidity impairs 
monetary transmission mechanism in these economies. Previous empirical assessments of the 
impact of excess liquidity on monetary transmission include Ruffer and Stracca (2006); Sørensen 
and Warner (2006); Lucchetta (2007); Egert and MacDonald (2009); Gigineishvili (2011) and 
Rocha (2012). Only the studies of Egert and MacDonald (2009) and Gigineishvili (2011) relate 
to non-industrial economies. Egert and MacDonald (2009) show that the reaction of banks to the 
monetary policy changes in Central and East European countries depends on certain 
characteristics, including their liquidity position. Gigineishvili (2011) estimates the interest rate 
pass-through in some 70 developing countries. The estimated pass-through coefficient is then 
explained by a host of macroeconomic variables, including liquidity holdings of banks. His 
findings suggest that excess bank liquidity impedes interest rate pass-through.  
In contrast to these studies, we assess the impact of excess liquidity by comparing the 
pass-through coefficient of the policy tools in a nested setting, by excluding and including excess 
liquidity in our models for pass-through. By doing so, this study makes a direct assessment of the 
effect of interbank liquidity on monetary policy transmission.  
The remainder of this section reviews studies on the pass-through of the policy rate to 
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retail interest rates and the exchange rate, for developing economies only. For detailed surveys of 
monetary transmission in industrial countries we refer to Boivin et al. (2010), Bhattacharya et al. 
(2011), Mishra et al. (2011) and Mohanty (2012).  
The survey of Mohanty and Turner (2008) among central banks of developing and 
emerging economies reveals that most central banks consider interest rates as the most important 
channel for the transmission of a policy shock. However, recent empirical studies on the interest 
rate pass-through yield diverse results. For example, using data for Turkey from April 2001 to 
June 2007, Ozdemir (2009) reports complete pass-through to the lending rate and the deposit rate 
in the long run. In a complete pass-through the changes in the policy tool are transmitted 
completely to the retail rates. Similarly, Durán-Víquez and Esquivel-Monge (2008) report 
complete pass-through of the policy interest rate in the long run, using data for the 1996-2007 
period for Costa Rica. In addition, Poddar et al. (2006) find that in Jordan the central bank’s 
target rate affects the banks’ retail rates. Ganev et al. (2002) and Dabla-Norris and Floerkemeier 
(2006) report complete pass-through only to the lending rates in some Eastern European 
countries (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, and Slovakia) and Armenia, 
respectively. Al-Mashat and Billmeier (2007) find that both lending and deposit rates move in 
the direction of policy changes in Egypt but only the change in the deposit rate is statistically 
significant. 
Similar to the findings for other developing economies, Table 1 summarizes related 
research on Pakistan. Except for Mohsin (2011), this literature suggests that the discount rate 
pass-through in the long run is almost complete for the lending rate, but sticky and often 
incomplete for the deposit rate. In their empirical investigations, the SBP (2005) and Hanif and 
Khan (2012) used the Auto Regressive Distributed Lag Approach, while Qayyum et al. (2006), 
and Khawaja and Khan (2008) apply the transfer function approach. The transfer function 
approach is frequently used to characterize the input-output relationships for a system that can be 
described by linear time-invariant differential equations. Using the panel cointegration 
methodology Mohsin (2011) reports a long-run relationship only between the discount rate and 
the lending rate.  
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The exchange rate is one of the policy variables through which monetary policy is 
transmitted to the larger economy by its impact on domestic inflation, the external sector, capital 
flows, and financial stability. The relationship between policy rates and the exchange rate can be 
described by the uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) hypothesis according to which the 
differential between domestic and foreign economies interest rates is determined by the 
differential between the future expected and the current exchange rate, and the time varying risk 
premium. The risk premium is the compensation required by the investors not only for an 
expected depreciation, but also for holding domestic assets.  
For developing economies and emerging market economies, the literature in general 
provides support for UIP (see for example, Bansal and Dahlquist, 2000; Flood and Rose, 2001; 
Frankel and Poonawala, 2006; and Ferreira and Leon-Ledesma, 2007).
5
 However, empirical 
literature on interest rate pass-through to the exchange rate in developing economies is scarce. 
This is also true for Pakistan. To the best of our knowledge, only Agha et al. (2005) study the 
impact of monetary policy changes on the real effective exchange rate in Pakistan. Using Vector 
                                                          
5
 Smets and Wouters (2002), Zorzi et al. (2007), Ito and Sato (2008), Boivin et al. (2010), and Bhattacharya et al. 
(2011) provide evidence about the linkages between the interest and the exchange rate channels for industrial 
economies. 
Table 1 Literature on Interest Rate Pass-through to Retail Rates in Pakistan 
Study Period Instrument Method 
Pass-through estimates 
Short run   Long run  
Lending 
rate 
Deposit 
Rate 
Lending 
rate 
Deposit 
Rate 
SBP  (2005) 
1999:07-
2006:06 
TB cut-off 
rate 
ARDL 0.198 0.044  0.987 0.444 
Qayyum et al. (2006) 
1991:03 -
2004:12 
TB rate TFA Nil 0.180  0.410² 0.223¹ 
Khawaja and Khan 
(2008) 
1991:06 -
2008:06 
TB rate TFA Nil Nil  0.430³ 0.160
4
 
Mohsin (2011) 
2001:11 - 
2011:03 
DR PC 0.100 0.160  0.200 Nil 
Hanif and Khan (2012) 
2001:07 - 
2011:08 
1-wk KIBOR ARDL 0.300 0.130  0.910 0.640 
Notes: TB: Treasury Bill, DR: Discount Rate, KIBOR: Karachi Interbank Offered Rate, ARDL: Auto Regressive 
Distributed Lags, TFA: Transfer Function Approach, PC: Panel Cointegration. Nil indicates no pass-through 
detected.  
¹ Pass-through to the saving deposit rate (deposit with less than 6-month maturity), while long-run pass-through 
takes around 3 years to complete. ² No short-run pass-through and long-run pass-through requires one and half to 
two years to complete. ³ Long-run pass-through requires one to one and half years. 
4
 Long-run pass-through 
requires one year. 
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Auto Regressions (VAR) they report that a 0.8 percentage point rise in the 6-month Treasury bill 
rate leads to a marginal appreciation of 0.2 percent of the real exchange rate during the first two 
months.  
 
3. Excess liquidity and monetary policy in Pakistan 
 
Saxegaard (2006) and Agénor et al. (2004) define excess liquidity as the ratio of the quantity of 
reserves deposited with the central bank by banks (and cash in their vaults) in excess of the 
statutory liquidity requirements, to the total time and demand liabilities of the banks. Mohanty et 
al. (2006) argue that if banks hold substantial government securities, bank reserves with the 
central bank only capture a part of the total holdings of liquid asset and therefore are less reliable 
as a measure of liquidity holdings. We therefore augment excess liquidity, as defined by 
Saxegaard (2006) and Agénor et al. (2004), with high-powered securities owned by banks that 
are eligible for statutory liquidity requirements. These securities include mostly short-term 
Treasury Bills and long-term government bonds (known as Pakistan Investment Bonds or PIBs) 
up to a maximum determined by the SBP. Thus the description of excess liquidity used in this 
study is the ratio of the quantity of bank reserves deposited with the central bank, cash held by 
banks, and securities that are eligible as reserves in excess of the statutory liquidity requirements, 
to the total time and demand deposits of banks.  
The SBP has a monetary targeting strategy with the objective of maintaining price 
stability and promoting economic growth. Its main policy tool is the discount rate. Theoretically, 
any change in the discount rate alters the marginal cost of maintaining excess reserves, which 
through changes in the marginal cost of interbank lending, is transmitted to retail rates. In 
addition, the SBP frequently uses direct policy tools, such as cash reserve requirements and 
statutory liquidity requirements. Cash reserve requirements consist of non-remunerated deposits 
that bank have to keep at the central bank to back up their deposit holdings. Statutory liquidity 
requirements refer to liquidity that banks are required to maintain in the form of government 
securities or securities of government-owned enterprises. Changes in both types of required 
reserves influence banks’ excess reserves, thereby changing the interbank market rates. The 
lending and the deposit rates, in turn, are influenced by the changes in the interbank market rates. 
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Between 2004 and 2011, the SBP tightened its policy frequently (see the upper panel in 
Figure 1 and Table 2) as the central bank was struggling to curtail inflation, which frequently 
was in the double-digit range.
6
 Real lending and deposit rates were mostly negative due to the 
high inflation during this period (see the panel in the middle in Figure 1). The banks’ nominal 
lending rates generally responded to the central bank’s tightening measures, but deposit rates 
were stickier.  
Until June 2008, the SBP had little success in increasing deposit rates. As a consequence, 
the SBP asked the banks to pay a minimum return of five percent on all savings products from 1 
June 2008.
7
 A floor for deposit rates implies that the nominal interest rate cannot fall beyond this 
level, reducing both the flexibility of monetary policy to address deflationary pressures and the 
                                                          
6
 For more details see Omer and Saqib (2008) and GoP (2007- 2009). 
7
 The regulatory deposit rate has been increased to 6 percent on May 01, 2012 (see BPRD Circular No. 01of 2012, 
SBP). 
Table 2. Changes in policy instruments, 2005-2010 
Date 
Cash reserve requirements   Liquidity requirements  
Discount 
rate 
Demand liabilities  Time liabilities  Demand 
liabilities 
Time 
liabilities Weakly 
average 
Daily 
minimum  
Weakly 
average 
Daily 
minimum   
31-Dec-05 5.0 4.0  5.0 4.0  15.0 15.0 9.0 
22-Jul-06 7.0 4.0  3.0 1.0  18.0 18.0  
29-Jul-06         9.5 
19-Jan-07 7.0 6.0  3.0 2.0     
1-Aug-07         10.0 
4-Aug-07 7.0 6.0  0.0 0.0  18.0 18.0  
2-Feb-08 8.0 7.0       10.5 
24-May-08 9.0 8.0     19.0 19.0 12.0 
30-Jul-08         13.0 
11-Oct-08 8.0 7.0        
18-Oct-08 6.0 5.0        
1-Nov-08 5.0 4.0        
13-Nov-08         15.0 
21-Apr-09         14.0 
15-Aug-09         13.0 
25-Nov-09         12.5 
2-Aug-10         13.0 
30-Sep-10         13.5 
30-Nov-10                14.0 
The table provides the chronological order of changes in policy instruments.  
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transmission of policy shocks through interest rates.  
Financial developments in this period and the relevant policy measures have amassed 
excess liquidity in the interbank market of Pakistan. For example, due to the global financial 
crisis the cash reserve requirements were relaxed. In the week that Lehmann Brothers fell, these 
requirements were brought down twice by 100 bps (see Table 2). Additionally, on 18 October 
2008 the SBP increased the eligibility of long-term government bonds for the statutory liquidity 
requirements from 5 to 10 percent. The move increased the borrowing ability of the banks from 
the SBP’s discount window roughly by PKR135 billion. Also, unprecedented foreign exchange 
inflows in the form of the remittances also allowed the banks to park funds in short-term 
government securities. Accordingly, the banking sector witnessed a steep growth in liquidity, 
specifically since June 2008.  
  
 9 
 
  
Top panel: shows required reserves and the discount rate.  
Middle panel: shows excess liquidity, the real lending and the real deposit rates.  
Bottom panel: shows the exchange rate and its monthly depreciation. Monthly depreciation is calculated 
using monthly growth in exchange rate.  
 10 
 
4. Model and methodology 
 
We first use unit root tests to examine the data generating processes of the variables used in the 
analysis. In a generalized form, an augmented unit root process can be described by  
t
k
p
ittt yyy   



1
1
110  
                (1) 
where ty is the series to be tested,  is the deterministic trend, 0 and 1 are parameters, while 
and 
i are the coefficients of the unit root and the lagged difference of the series, respectively, 
and t is the error term (for details, see Enders, 2004 Chapter 4; and Hamilton, 1994 Chapter 15). 
Conventionally, the unit root tests test the null hypothesis that the series has a unit root, i.e. 
1 . As the Figure 1 suggest a structural shift in the banks’ behavior, this study also utilizes 
unit root tests with structural shifts when conventional unit root tests fails to reject the null 
hypothesis.  
The tests suggested by Clemente et al. (1998) allow for unit root testing with two breaks. 
This test is an extension of the Perron and Vogelsang (1992) test with one structural break.
8
 This 
class of unit root tests distinguishes two types of outliers: an additive outlier and an innovative 
outlier. The additive outlier test suits best to series exhibiting a sudden change in the mean, while 
the innovative outlier test assumes that the change takes place gradually. As the power of these 
tests improves considerably if the break points are known a priori, often the tests employ grid 
search to locate the break dates. For simplicity, assume that the breaks occur at an unknown date,
TTT bb  211 , with T being the sample size. The additive outlier test follows a two-step 
procedure. First, the deterministic part of the series is filtered using  
tttt yDUDUy
~
2211   ,            (2) 
where the break dummies 1mtDU  for bmTt  , and 0 otherwise, for m = 1, 2, and the remaining 
part noise ty
~  is examined for a unit root  
                                                          
8
 If the test of Clemente et al. (1998) suggests that both structural shifts are significant we keep this result. However, 
if this test finds only one significant structural shift we employ the Perron and Vogelsang (1992) test. 
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The change in the break dummy 1)( itbmTD  if 1 bmTt  and zero otherwise; m1 and m2 are 
the maximum lags of the breaks; ty
~  are included to control for serial correlation and 
heteroskedasticity in the errors, while k-1 is the truncated lag parameter. Often specification of 
lag length in a unit root tests involves practical issues. If k-1 is too small then the remaining 
serial correlation in the errors will bias the test. If k is too large then the power of the test will 
suffer. Here the lag length k is determined by a set of sequential F-tests.
9
  
The innovative outlier model assumes that an economic shock to a variable affects the 
subsequent observations. Starting from its initial position the shocks propagate to the subsequent 
observations through the memory of the system. The estimation strategy of innovative outlier 
tests is based on;  
tit
k
i
ittbtbttt eycyTDTDDUDUy  


 
1
1
1221122111 )()(  ,          (4) 
 ))(( 2211 tttt DUDUeLay   .                          (5) 
In Equations (2) and (4), i measures the immediate impact of the changes in the mean. 
The innovative outlier test can identify the long-run impact of changes in trends by the design of 
its alternative hypothesis. Here, L  is the lag operator defined as 1 tt yLy , while )(L  defines 
the moving average representation of a stationary and invertible noise function te . The 
immediate impact of a change in the mean is equal to m , m=1,2, and the long-run impact is 
)1(m  in Equation (5), where )1(  is equal to the sum of all coefficients of the lag polynomial 
)(L . Both models test the null hypothesis of a unit root, that is 1 . The limiting distribution 
of these test statistics does not follow the Dickey–Fuller distribution; Perron and Vogelsang 
(1992) and Clemente et al. (1998) provide the critical values for one and two structural breaks, 
                                                          
9
 This procedure works as follows: First, for a given value of Tbm, a maximum value of k (kmax) the auto regressions 
(AR) are estimated with (kmax), and (kmax - 1) lags. If the F-test suggests that the coefficient of 
thkmax lag is significant, 
the value of k is chosen. If not, the model is estimated with (kmax - 1) versus (kmax – 2) lags. The procedure is repeated 
by lowering k until a rejection of the null hypothesis that additional lags are insignificant occurs or the lower bound 
k = 0 is attained. 
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respectively. The null hypothesis is rejected if 1 ; in that case the series is level stationary. 
The Clemente et al. (1998) tests collapse to the Perron and Vogelsang (1992) tests when the 
restriction m=1, is imposed, i.e. there is only one break. 
To estimate the policy tools’ pass-through, we follow the procedure of De Bondt (2002) 
and Chong et al. (2006). We employ the vector auto regressions (VAR) methodology for 
estimating the relationships between the policy tools and the impact variables (lending rate, 
deposit rate, and exchange rate). We employ levels of all variables in the VAR except for the 
variables which are difference stationary, as indicated by the unit root tests. For the difference-
stationary series, we use first differences. The VAR methodology presumes that all regressors 
are endogenous, where variables are explained by their lags. A VAR for N variables of order p is 
written as  
tptt ZLZ   )( ,           (6) 
where '21 ),...,,( Ntttt zzzZ  represents a vector of (Nx1) variables with their p lags, )(L  is a lag 
polynomial of order p, while t  is (Nx1) unobservable zero mean white noise vector process. 
The optimal lag length k is selected using the HQ criterion (as suggested by Lütkepohl and 
Kratzig, 2004).  
The coefficients of the first lag of the policy tools of the VAR estimates shows the 
immediate impact of changes in the policy tool, generally termed as the short-run pass-through 
of policy tools. The long-run pass-through coefficient ˆ  for the first variable is found by 
aggregating and normalizing the short-run coefficients. To illustrate this for a bivariate VAR 
system with two lags, such as: 
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where )(11 L  are coefficients of the lag dependent variable and )(12 L  are coefficients of the 
explanatory variable of interest. 
 
5. Data  
 
The monetary policy instruments in Pakistan change infrequently (for details, see Table 2). 
Therefore, following Agha et al. (2005), Qayyum et al. (2006), and Khawaja and Khan (2008), 
we use the 6-month market Treasury bill rate as a proxy for the discount rate.
10
 Reserve 
requirements often suffer from a similar non-variability problem. Finding a proxy for the reserve 
requirements is not easy which may explain why previous studies have not considered the pass-
through of this instrument. Since 22
nd
 July 2006 the SBP imposed separate reserve requirements 
for time and demand liabilities (also shown in Table 2).
11
 We will therefore use the effective 
reserve requirements as weighted average of the cash reserve requirements and the statutory 
liquidity requirements. This creates sufficient variability in reserve requirements to be used for 
estimation purposes. 
We use monthly data from July 2004 to December 2011.
12
 Table 3 provides the 
descriptive statistics of the variables employed. The lending and the deposit rates used are 
weighted averages of rates offered by banks on new loans and deposits using amounts as 
weights, in any given month.
13
 These rates are consistently available since July 2004. Prior to 
July 2004, the lending rate reported referred to new lending, while the deposit rate reported 
referred to outstanding deposits. Monthly data on excess liquidity is based on information for the 
last weekend of the month.  
                                                          
10
 The correlation between the discount rate and the 6-month Treasury bill rate in our sample is 0.966.    
11
 The SBP defines special notice deposits and time deposits with maturity of 12 months or less as demand 
liabilities. Time deposits with maturities above 12 months are categorized as time liabilities.  
12
 The sample size reduces to June 2005 - June 2011 when the investigation involves excess liquidity. We also 
estimated all models reported for this shorter sample period but this gave fairly similar results. 
13
 Weighted averages are calculated by weighting interest rates by the corresponding amounts of loans/deposits 
across all banks.  The formula used by the SBP is: . (amount)amount)(rate  Rate Average Weighted 
Table 3 Descriptive Statistics 
Variables 
No. of 
Observation Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Lending rate 88 11.50 2.74 4.63 15.54 
Deposit rate 88 5.83 2.06 1.20 9.53 
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Currently, the SBP reports net time and demand liabilities excluding the foreign currency 
and Islamic banks’ deposits. The foreign currency and Islamic banks’ deposits are reported 
separately, with different statutory requirements. Before December 2005, reported data included 
both foreign exchange and Islamic banks’ deposits and hence are not comparable to the current 
data. We have successfully extended the time series for deposits six month backward using 
reported information of the SBP so that our sample starts in June 2005. We use the growth rate 
of the exchange rate, as the pass-through estimation requires that variables used have the same 
unit of measurement. All data have been kindly provided by the SBP.  
 
6. Results  
 
Table 4 provides the results of the conventional unit root tests, as well as unit root tests allowing 
for structural breaks. The results suggest that except for excess liquidity all variables included in 
the investigation are level stationary. For instance, the null hypothesis of unit root is rejected at 
10 percent significance level for the lending rate (Phillips-Perron test) and for the deposit rate 
(innovative outlier test). Moreover, the test results for the deposit rate suggest that this variable 
has two significant structural shifts. Similarly, the results for the required reserves also suggest 
two structural shifts in this variable. The identified break dates are in the vicinity of the policy 
moves of the SBP as described in Table 2. For example, the results for required reserves show 
that the series had a structural break in May 2005 and August 2008. Table 2 shows that the SBP 
increased the cash reserve requirements on demand liability by 200 bps in July 2006, and by 100 
bps in May 2008. 
Only excess liquidity follows a difference stationary or I(1) process as a unit root null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected at the 5 percent significance level both for the conventional unit 
root tests and for the unit root tests incorporating structural breaks. We therefore employ first 
differences of the excess liquidity in the VAR system. 
 
Discount rate 90 11.32 2.13 9.00 15.00 
6-month market Treasury bill rate 88 9.99 2.74 2.58 13.44 
Excess liquidity 74 11.75 4.94 2.13 23.19 
Required reserve 74 21.58 2.47 19.48 26.59 
Exchange rate   87 70.79 11.60 58.45 87.50 
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The break dates identified by the unit root tests are different for each variable indicating 
that different policy moves by the central bank may have had different impacts on these 
variables. We incorporate only one shift, the break in June 2008. Several important 
developments suggest that a structural shift has occurred in the financial system of Pakistan in 
June 2008. On 1 June 2008, the SBP imposed a minimum regulatory deposit rate of five percent, 
to be paid to the depositors, on all savings products as discussed in Section 3. Moreover, excess 
liquidity of banks witnessed an unprecedented growth since June 2008 (see the panel in the 
middle in Figure 1). Finally, the SBP changed its use of policy tools. After May 2008, reserve 
Table 4 Unit Root Test Results 
 Without Structural Break  With Structural Break 
 Dickey-Fuller test  Philips-Perron test  Additive outlier test  Innovative Outlier test 
 No trend Trend No trend Trend  Stats # Breaks Dates  Stats # Breaks Dates 
Lending 
rate -1.439 -1.268  -2.742** -2.159         
Deposit 
rate -1.973 -1.935  -2.122 -2.098  -4.683 2 
11-05, 
02-08  -3.915** 2 
12-05, 
01-08 
Discount 
rate -0.931 -1.800  -3.005* -2.978         
Required 
reserves -1.486 -2.98  -1.666 -1.876  -5.718* 2 
08-06, 
11-08  -14.722* 2 
05-06, 
08-08 
Excess 
liquidity 0.771 -1.447  -0.17 -1.088  -0.655 2 
03-08, 
03-09  -3.061 2 
12-07, 
08-08 
Exchange 
rate -2.143 -2.109  -7.205 -7.173*         
*5% C. V 
No Break -2.911 -3.476  -2.9 -3.463         
1-break       -3.560    -4.270   
2-breaks        -5.490    -5.490   
**10% C.V. 
No Break -2.590 -3.166  -2.585 -3.158         
1-break       -3.22    -3.86   
2-breaks        -5.24    -5.24   
Notes: The additive outlier test assumes a sudden break while the innovative outlier test assumes a break in trend. 
The null hypothesis of ADF or PP test is that the series has a unit root, while for Clemente et at. (1998) test is that 
the series has unit root with structural breaks. For details see Clemente et at. (1998). Dates indicates break dates and 
should be read as month and year (mm-yy). 
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requirements were relaxed but the central bank continued to raise the discount rate (see Table 2). 
Earlier, the SBP used both the required reserves and the discount rate for monetary tightening. In 
view of the structural shift in June 2008 and following Glynn et al. (2007), we include both shift 
and pulse dummies (change in the shift dummy) in our VAR models. 
Tables A1, A2, and A3 in the Appendix to this study present the detailed estimates of the 
VAR models showing the short-run (upper panel) and long-run (the lower panel) impact of the 
changes in policy rates on the lending rate, the deposit rate, and the exchange rate, respectively. 
Various diagnostic tests are applied to each model, the results of which are provided in Table A4, 
also in the Appendix.
14
 Although the assumption that the residuals are normally distributed is 
often rejected, we analyze deviations from normality using a non-parametric Kernel density 
estimation procedure. Kernel density estimators, similar to histograms, approximate the density 
f(x) from observations on x. The data are divided into non-overlapping intervals, and counts are 
made of the number of data points within each interval. The kernel density estimates presented in 
Figures A1 to A12 in Appendix show the density estimates of residuals and a normally 
distributed data with similar features. These graphs suggest that the residuals deviation from 
normality is generally marginal and can be ignored without significant implication for inference. 
Table 5 provides the long-run pass-through estimates. The upper panel shows the 
estimates for the discount rate while the lower panel shows the estimates for required reserves. 
Before discussing the long-run pass-through results in more details, we want to point out that the 
dummies for the structural breaks are significant in most of the cases supporting that a structural 
shift in the interbank market of Pakistan occurred in June 2008. Therefore, previous studies on 
monetary transmission in Pakistan may have produced misleading inferences by ignoring this 
shift if the data span covers 2008. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
14
 Details of the applied diagnostic tests can be found at the bottom of Table A5. 
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6.1 Pass-through to the lending rate 
 
The coefficient of the discount rate in model (1) of Table 5 is significant at the five percent level 
and suggests that 0.93 percentage-points of a unit shock to the discount rate is passed on to the 
lending rate in the long run. Thus, the long-run pass-through to the lending rate is almost 
complete. However, when excess liquidity is introduced in the model, the pass-through becomes 
insignificant (model (2)). In other words, a change in discount rate has no significant effect on 
the lending rate when one controls for excess liquidity. 
Table 5 Long-run Interest Rate and Exchange Rate Pass-through Estimates 
Dependent variable Lending rate   Deposit rate   Exchange rate 
Include excess liquidity No Yes  No Yes  No  Yes 
Policy tool: discount rate 
Model No. (1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) (6) 
Discount rate 0.928* 0.489  0.586 -0.325  -0.0784 0.196 
 [0.002] [0.196]  [0.200] [0.613]  [0.746] [ 0.713] 
D(Excess liquidity)   -0.448*   -0.342   0.195 
  [0.018]   [0.174]   [0.567] 
Intercept  2.224* 6.156*  0.198 8.294**  0.406 -2.061 
 [0.037] [0.001]  [0.933] [0.074]  [0.845] [0.663] 
Break Dummy 0.156 1.861*  0.186 3.532**  0.072 -0.862 
 [0.750] [0.008]  [0.877] [0.076]  [0.948] [0.677] 
D(Break) 4.360* 2.246*  5.095** 0.690  -0.959 -0.160 
  [0.000] [0.018]  [0.054] [0.823]  [0.675] [0.957] 
Policy tool: required reserves 
Model No. (7) (8)  (9) (10)  (11) (12) 
Required reserves 0.232* 0.210*  0.322* 0.301*  -0.362* -0.361* 
 [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000] [0.000] 
D(Excess liquidity)  -0.244*   -0.112   0.133 
  [0.010]   [0.327]   [0.262] 
Intercept  5.367* 5.839*  -2.095 1.600  7.887* 7.890* 
 [0.004] [0.003]  [0.154] 0.270  [0.001] [0.000] 
Break Dummy 3.965* 4.072*  3.126* 3.127*  -1.118* -1.226* 
 [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000] [0.000]  [0.001] [0.000] 
D(Break) 0.912 -0.059  1.058 -1.449  0.348 0.884 
  [0.448] [0.961]  [0.429] [0.283]  [0.780 ] [0.503] 
Notes: *, **, indicates significance at respectively the 5 and 10 percent levels. The coefficients are the long-run 
pass-through estimates of shocks to the regressors (policy variable and excess liquidity) on the impact variables 
(lending rate, deposit rate, and exchange rate) as calculated by Equation 7. 
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The coefficient of excess liquidity in model (2) is negative and significant at the 5 percent 
level indicating that any unit positive change to the (difference of) excess liquidity leads to a 
decrease in the lending rate by 0.45 percentage point in the long-run. This result suggests that an 
increase in excess liquidity has a deterring effect on the lending rate in the long-run. Our findings 
of lending rate pass-through with model (1) are in line with the literature on monetary 
transmission in Pakistan (see Table 1) suggesting high pass-through to the lending rate in the 
long-run (SBP, 2005; Khawaja and Khan, 2008; and Hanif and Khan, 2012). Also our finding 
that inclusion of excess liquidity has a decreasing effect on the pass-through to lending rates is in 
line with some previous research for other countries (Ruffer and Stracca, 2006; Sørensen and 
Warner, 2006; Lucchetta, 2007; and Gigineishvili, 2011).
15
 
 Models (7) and (8) in Table 4 show the estimates for the long-run pass-through from 
required reserves to the lending rate. The coefficients indicate that the long-run pass-through to 
the lending rate is only 0.23- percentage point and significant at the 5- percent level. Inclusion of 
excess reserves has negligible effect on lending rate and reduces the long-run pass-through to 
0.21 percentage point. The results suggest that the long-run pass-through of required reserves to 
the lending rate is low and incomplete.  
 
6.2 Pass-through to the deposit rate 
 
Models (3) and (4) in Table 5 show that the pass-through of the discount rate to the deposit rate 
is insignificant independent of the presence of excess liquidity in the model. Our findings of no 
pass-through of the discount rate to the deposit rate stands in contrast to the findings of the SBP 
(2005) and Khawaja and Khan (2008) who report low pass-through of the discount rate to the 
deposit rate. The introduction of the regulatory deposit rate in June 2008 may have destroyed the 
weak pass-through to the deposit rate, reported by earlier studies. Significant break dummies 
weakly supports our argument that the transmission mechanism to the deposit rate has changed.
16
  
                                                          
15
 The lower panel of Table A1 (model (1) and (3) in grey) shows the results for the model in which the causality 
runs in the opposite direction. The results suggest that the lending rate has no effect on the discount rate independent 
of the inclusion of excess liquidity in the model. 
16
 The lower panel of Table A2 (models (3) and (4) in grey) shows the results for the models in which the causality 
runs in the opposite direction. The results suggest that the deposit rate has significant long-run effect at the 5 percent 
level on the discount rate only when excess liquidity is controlled for (model (4)). A 100 bps increase in the deposit 
rate leads to 46 bps increase in the discount rate. The reverse causation from the deposit rate to the discount rate 
indicates the ineffectiveness of this policy tool. Perhaps, the regulatory deposit rate imposed by the SBP may have 
strengthened this reverse causation from the deposit rate to the discount rate, while weakening the desired 
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 Models (9) and (10) in Table 5 show the long-run pass-through of required reserves to the 
deposit rate. Typically, this long-run pass-through is low, independent of whether excess 
liquidity is included or not. Almost 0.32 percentage point of a unit shock to required reserves is 
passed through to the deposit rate in the long run. If excess liquidity is controlled for, this pass-
through reduces marginally to 0.30 percentage points. Still, compared to the discount rate, 
reserve requirements appear to be a more effective policy tool for influencing the deposit rate.  
 
6.3 Pass-through to the exchange rate 
 
Models (5) and (6) in Table 5 show the long-run pass-through estimates of the discount rate to 
the exchange rate. The coefficients of the discount rate are insignificant independent of the 
inclusion of excess liquidity in the model. This suggests that the discount rate does not influence 
the (growth of the) exchange rate in the long run.
17
  
 Models (11) and (12) in Table 5 display the pass-through of required reserves to the 
(growth in) exchange rate. The coefficient is significant at the five percent, independent of the 
inclusion of excess liquidity in the model. A one percent increase in required reserves leads to a 
0.38 percentage point appreciation in Pakistan Rupee against the US Dollar. However, when 
excess liquidity is controlled for, the appreciation of the Pakistan Rupee slightly reduces to 0.36 
percentage points. 
 
7. Conclusions  
We have investigated the effect of excess liquidity on the pass-through from the discount rate 
and required reserves to retail interest rates and the exchange rate in Pakistan. For this purpose, 
data from July 2004 to December 2011 has been used. Our findings suggest that excess liquidity 
significantly affects the pass-through of the discount rate to the lending rate. Moreover, the pass-
through to the lending rate is complete for the discount rate but incomplete for required reserves. 
However, only changes in required reserves affect the deposit rate and the exchange rate in the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
transmission mechanism from the discount rate to the deposit rate. Moreover, this result also suggests that excess 
liquidity has a distortionary effect on the interest rate pass-through to the deposit rate. 
17
 The estimates for the models in which the causality runs in the opposite direction (shown in the lower panel of 
Table A3, model (5) in grey) suggest that exchange rate movements significantly influence the discount rate. A one 
percent depreciation of the exchange rate leads to a 0.73 percentage point decrease of the discount rate. As discussed 
in Section 2, this relationship is not in line with the UIP hypothesis. We suspect that this result is related to the 
borrowing cost on external debt and may be period specific.  
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long run, even though pass-through is incomplete. Additionally, our results suggest the presence 
of a structural shift in the interbank money market in Pakistan in June 2008. Studies ignoring this 
shift may produce misleading conclusions.  
Our finding is important as the global increase in liquidity has resulted in foreign capital 
inflows to the developing and emerging economies thereby flooding their interbank markets with 
excess liquidity (for a detailed discussion, see Chinn, 2013). Also Ahmed and Zlate (2013), 
while discussing the impact of foreign capital inflows to emerging economies, point out that the 
monetary policies of the emerging economies are likely to suffer from this increase in excess 
interbank liquidity. Therefore, our study provides first-hand information on the impact of excess 
liquidity on the monetary policy transmission mechanism in developing economies. The 
conclusion of our study is likely to help policy makers in developing economies, in general, and 
Pakistan, in particular.   
Finally, some caveats are in order. First, we have considered only positive changes to the 
policy tools assuming that the negative changes will have similar effect on our symmetric 
models. The literature on monetary policy pass-through suggests that pass-through is often 
different for positive and negative changes in the policy tools. As our data primarily refer to a 
period with monetary tightening, we leave this issue of asymmetric pass-through for future 
research. Second, the interbank market involves other players, like Islamic banks, microfinance 
banks, and non-bank financial institutions in addition to commercial banks. However, in view of 
their low shares in the interbank market, their excess liquidity position is unlikely to affect our 
conclusions.  
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Appendix 
Table A1 Estimates of Policy Impact on Lending Rate 
Model # (1) (1) (2) (2)  (7) (7) (8) (8) 
Dependent Variable 
Lending 
rate 
Discount 
rate 
Lending 
rate 
Discount 
rate  
Lending 
rate 
Required 
reserves 
Lending 
rate 
Required 
reserves 
Policy Tool  
Discount 
rate 
Discount 
rate 
Discount 
rate 
Discount 
rate  
Required 
reserves 
Lending 
rate 
Required 
reserves 
Lending 
rate 
Liquidity  Included No No Yes Yes  No No Yes Yes 
Lag Selection criteria  HQ  HQ  HQ  AIC  HQ HQ SBC SBC 
No of Lags (5,5) (5,5) (5,5,5) (5,5,5)  (1,1) (1,1) (1,1,1) (1,1,1) 
Lending rate (-1) 0.725* 0.122 0.725* 0.183*  0.720* 0.007 0.714* -0.044 
 [0.000] [0.189] [0.000] [0.080]  [0.000] [0.962] [0.000] [0.784] 
Lending rate (-2) -0.073 0.043 -0.191 0.057      
 [0.572] [0.712] [0.175] [0.655]      
Lending rate (-3) 0.233** -0.127 0.369* -0.136      
 [0.064] [0.263] [0.005] [0.261]      
Lending rate (-4) 0.0964 0.313* -0.158 0.2100*      
 [0.458] [0.008] [0.238] [0.085]      
Lending rate (-5) -0.294* -0.435* -0.0477 -0.437*      
 [0.002] [0.000] [0.613] [0.000]      
Discount rate (-1) 0.343* 0.878* 0.370* 0.907*      
 [0.002] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000]      
Discount rate (-2) -0.098 -0.432* -0.236 -0.414*      
 [0.490] [0.001] [0.113] [0.002]      
Discount rate (-3) -0.004 0.224** 0.128 0.065      
 [0.980] [0.088] [0.409] [0.645]      
Discount rate (-4) 0.0832 0.0783 0.0482 0.404*      
 [0.553] [0.536] [0.739] [0.002]      
Discount rate (-5) -0.034 0.1704** -0.163 0.048      
 [0.744] [0.072] [0.149] [0.641]      
Required reserves (-1)      0.065* 0.867* 0.060* 0.872* 
      [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
D(Excess liquidity (-1))   -0.064 -0.014    -0.070* 0.088 
   [0.011] [0.547]    [0.010] [0.299] 
D(Excess liquidity (-2))   -0.008 0.031      
   [0.735] [0.171]      
D(Excess liquidity (-3))   0.0138 -0.0060      
   [0.589] [0.783]      
D(Excess liquidity (-4))   -0.0224 -0.0310      
   [0.368] [0.177]      
D(Excess liquidity (-5))   -0.054* -0.008      
   [0.027] [0.711]      
Intercept 0.696* 1.621* 1.855* 1.212*  1.503* 3.127* 1.669* 3.559* 
 [0.037] [0.000] [0.001] [0.020]  [0.004] [0.047] [0.003] [0.040] 
Break 0.0488 0.626* 0.677* 0.417*  1.110* -0.692 1.164* -0.569 
 [0.750] [0.000] [0.018] [0.031]  [0.000] [0.258] [0.000] [0.379] 
D(Break) 1.364* 0.473** 0.561 0.489**  0.255 1.026* 2.146 1.222 
 [0.000] [0.087] [0.008] [0.060]  [0.448] [0.047] [0.961] [0.251] 
Long run Pass-Through Coefficients 
Discount rate 0.928*  0.489       
 [0.002]  [0.196]       
Required reserves      0.232*  0.210*  
      [0.000]  [0.000]  
Lending rate  -1.042  11.322   0.0524  -0.344 
  [0.282]  [0.190]   [0.962]  [0.784] 
D(Excess liquidity)    -0.448 2.577    -0.244 0.686 
   [0.018] [0.593]    [0.010] [0.299] 
Notes: Gray columns indicate the auxiliary regression showing the reverse direction of presumed relationship. No. of lags read 
as (dependent variables, policy/impact variable, excess liquidity). * and ** respectively indicates significance at 5 and 10 
percent level. HQ and AIC indicates Hannan-Quinn and Akaike Information Criteria respectively. Long-run pass-through 
estimates are based on Equation 7. 
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Table A2 Estimates of Policy Impact on Deposit Rate 
Model # (3) (3) (4) (4)  (9) (9) (10) (10) 
Dependent Variable 
Deposit 
rate 
Discount 
rate 
Deposit 
rate 
Deposit 
rate  
Deposit 
rate 
Required 
reserves 
Deposit 
rate 
Required 
reserves 
Policy Tool  
Discount 
rate 
Discount 
rate 
Discount 
rate 
Discount 
rate  
Required 
reserves 
Required 
reserves 
Required 
reserves 
Required 
reserves 
Liquidity Included No No Yes Yes  No  No Yes Yes 
Lag Selection criteria  HQ HQ HQ HQ  HQ HQ SBC SBC 
No of Lags (4,4)  (4,4) (1,1,1)  (1,1,1)   (1,1)  (1,1)  (1,1,1) (1,1,1) 
Deposit rate (-1) 0.633* 0.119 0.841* 0.150*  0.691* 0.034 0.806* -0.284* 
 [0.000] [0.137] [0.000] [0.006]  [0.000] [0.823] [0.000] [0.030] 
Deposit rate (-2) 0.298* 0.220*        
 [0.021] [0.021]        
Deposit rate (-3) -0.036 -0.114        
 [0.784] [0.249]        
Deposit rate (-4) -0.050 -0.188*        
 [0.672] [0.031]        
Discount rate (-1) 0.267** 0.866* -0.052 0.676*      
 [0.069] [0.000] [0.613] [0.000]      
Discount rate (-2) -0.456* -0.459*        
 [0.015] [0.001]        
Discount rate (-3) 0.603* 0.300*        
 [0.001] [0.033]        
Discount rate (-4) -0.323* 0.097        
 [0.012] [0.311]        
Required reserves (-1)      0.099* 0.861* 0.052* 0.927* 
      [0.000] [0.000] [0.015] [0.000] 
D(Excess liquidity (-1))   -0.054 -0.044    -0.019 0.087 
   [0.174] [0.112]    [0.640] [0.331] 
Intercept 0.0307* 1.570* 1.320 2.137*  -0.648 3.152* -0.158 3.148* 
 [0.933] [0.000] [0.074] [0.000]  [0.154] [0.003] [0.760] [0.006] 
Break Dummy 0.0289 0.647* 0.562 0.814*  0.967* -0.769 0.533* 0.331 
 [0.877] [0.000] [0.076] [0.000]  [0.000] [0.136] [0.004] [0.418] 
D(Break) 0.790** 0.360* 0.110 0.086  -0.327 1.083 0.070 0.569 
 [0.054] [0.000] [0.823] [0.799]  [0.429] [0.261] [0.875] [0.564] 
Long run Pass-Through Coefficients 
Discount rate  0.586  -0.325       
 [0.200]  [0.613]       
Required reserves       0.322*  0.301*  
      [0.000]  [0.000]  
Deposit rate  0.196  0.464*   0.246  0.072 
  [0.501]  [0.006]   [0.823]  [0.950] 
D(Excess liquidity)    -.342 -0.135    -0.112 0.654 
   [0.174] [0.112]    [0.327] [0.304] 
Notes: Gray columns indicate the auxiliary regression showing the reverse direction of presumed relationship. No. 
of lags read as (dependent variables, policy/impact variable, excess liquidity). * and ** respectively indicates 
significance at 5 and 10 percent level. HQ and AIC indicates Hannan-Quinn and Akaike Information Criteria 
respectively. Long-run pass-through estimates are based on Equation 7. 
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Table A3 Estimates of Policy Impact on Exchange Rate Growth 
Model # (5) (5) (6) (6)    (11) (11) (12) (12) 
Dep. Var. 
Exchange 
rate 
Discount 
rate 
Exchange 
rate 
Discount 
rate  
Exchange 
rate 
Required 
reserves 
Exchange 
rate 
Required 
reserves 
Policy Tool  
Discount 
rate 
Discount 
rate 
Discount 
rate 
Discount 
rate  
Required 
reserves 
Required 
reserves 
Required 
reserves 
Required 
reserves 
Liquidity Included No No Yes yes  No  No Yes Yes 
Lag Selection HQ  HQ  HQ HQ   HQ  HQ  HQ  HQ  
No. of Lags (4,4) (4,4) (2,2,2) (2,2,2)   (1,1) (1,1) (1,1,1) (1,1,1) 
Exchange rate (-1) 0.281* 0.029 0.201** 0.065*  0.079 -0.066 0.081 -0.066 
 [0.008] [0.296] [0.079] [0.013]  [0.485] [0.450] [0.473] [0.456] 
Exchange rate (-2) 0.338* -0.055* 0.319* -0.070*      
 [0.001] [0.039] [0.007] [0.010]      
Exchange rate (-3) -0.043 -0.012        
 [0.683] [0.679]        
Exchange rate (-4) -0.100 -0.074*        
 [0.327] [0.005]        
Discount rate (-1) -0.479 0.972* -0.796** 1.070*      
 [0.238] [0.000] [0.096] [0.000]      
Discount rate (-2) -0.069 -0.501* 0.890* -0.275*      
 [0.899] [0.000] [0.037] [0.005]      
Discount rate (-3) 0.8964** 0.328*        
 [0.098] [0.019]        
Discount rate (-4) -0.389 0.047        
 [0.268] [0.608]        
Required reserves (-1)      -0.334* 0.847* -0.332* 0.847* 
      [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
D(Excess liquidity(-1))   0.123 -0.025    0.122 0.083 
   [0.307] [0.367]    [0.262] [0.328] 
D(Excess liquidity (-1))   -0.029 -0.002      
   [0.794] [0.933]      
Intercept 0.213 1.422* -0.988 1.836*  7.263* 3.637* 7.249 3.653* 
 [0.845] [0.000] [0.663] [0.001]  [0.000] [0.003] [0.000] [0.003] 
Break 0.038 0.485* -0.413 0.737*  -1.030* -0.743* -1.126 -0.813* 
 [0.948] [0.001] [0.677] [0.001]  [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] 
D(Break) -0.503 0.565** -0.077 0.312  0.320 0.969 0.812 1.307 
  [0.675] [0.068] [0.957] [0.336]  [0.780] [0.278] [0.503] [0.167] 
Long run Pass-Through Coefficients 
Discount rate -0.078  0.196       
 [0.746]  [0.713]       
Required reserves      -0.363*  -0.362  
      [0.002]  [0.000]  
Exchange rate   -0.725*  -0.024   -0.434  -0.431 
  [0.003]  [0.874]   [0.450]  [0.456] 
D(Excess liquidity)   0.195 -0.132    0.133 0.541 
   [0.567] [0.471]    [0.262] [0.328] 
Notes: Gray columns indicate the auxiliary regression showing the reverse direction of presumed relationship. No. 
of lags read as (dependent variables, policy/impact variable, excess liquidity). * and ** respectively indicates 
significance at 5 and 10 percent level. HQ and AIC indicates Hannan-Quinn and Akaike Information Criteria 
respectively. Long-run pass-through estimates are based on Equation 7. 
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Table A4 Diagnostic Checks of the Estimated Relationship 
Model # (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6)     (7) (8)   (9) (10)   (11) (12) 
Dependent Variable Lending rate    Deposit rate   Exchange rate     Lending rate    Deposit rate   Exchange rate 
D(Excess Liquidity) included No Yes  No Yes  No Yes   No Yes  No Yes  No Yes 
Policy Instrument Discount rate    Required reserves  
Serial Correlation 1.912 10.871  1.042 5.296  6.346 11.728   0.401 6.628  0.326 7.061  0.813 13.137 
 [0.752] [0.285]  [0.904] [0.808]  [0.175] [0.230]   [0.983] [0.676]  [0.989] [0.631]  [0.937] [0.156] 
Normality 1.644 0.339  18.198 16.060  200.357 135.919   40.221 76.551  28.066 24.231  48.892 32.721 
 [0.440] [0.844]  [0.001] [0.001]  [0.000] [0.000]   [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000] [0.000] 
EV Stability Condition Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes   Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Notes: The serial correlation is tested using the LM test. For checking stability of VAR models, Eigen value stability conditions requires these calculated Eigen 
values to be should be strictly less than one (Lütkepohl, 2005). The normality of residuals is tested using the Jargue-Bera test. Table presents only the normality 
test for the main model where policy tool (and excess liquidity) affects the impact variables (lending rate, deposit rate, and exchange rate). Both test statistics are 
Chi-square test statistics. 
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Figures   
 Figures for the kernel density estimates show the density estimates of residuals 
and a normally distributed data with similar features. Kernel density estimators, similar to 
histograms, approximate the density f(x) from observations on x. The data are divided into non-
overlapping intervals, and counts are made of the number of data points within each interval.  
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Figure A1 Model 1 (Kernel Density Estimate)
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Figure A2 Model 2 (Kernel Density Estimate)
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Figure A3 Model 3 (Kernel Density Estimate)
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Figure A4: Model 4 (Kernel Density Estimate)
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Figure A5: Model 5 (Kernel Density Estimate)
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Figure A6: Model 6 (Kernel Density Estimate)
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Figure 7: Model 7 (Kernel Density Estimate)
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Figure A8: Model 8 (Kernel Density Estimate)
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Figure A9: Model 9 (Kernel Density Estimate)
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Figure A10: Model 10 (Kernel Density Estimate)
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Figure A11: Model 11 (Kernel Density Estimate)
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Figure A12: Model 12 (Kernel Density Estimate)
